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Executive Summary 
 
South Korea has implemented strong land use regulations controlling the growth of the 
capitol region (Seoul, and around areas) in order to encourage balanced regional development 
between the capitol area and the non-capitol area. However, there are ongoing debates about the 
relationship between the regulatory policies and the balanced regional development. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of the effect that the land use 
deregulation in the capitol region has on growth of both regions. To address this question, I use a 
difference-in-differences model to empirically analyze how the land use deregulation in the 
capitol region in 2008 has affected the economic growth of the capitol and non-capitol regions. 
 
The results suggest that the deregulations in the capitol region have no significant effects 
on the change of GRDP. In other words, the regulatory policy in the capitol region does not 
promote balanced regional development because the deregulation does not restrict the economic 
growth of the non-capitol region. Moreover, the GRDP has a high correlation with the factors 
related to productivity such as economically active population and operating surplus. One 
possible explanation for this result is that the difference of economic growth between regions 
depends on the difference of productivity in each region. Therefore, Korea’s government needs 
to consider policies that promote productivity of less developed regions to balance the regional 
growth.     
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1. Introduction  
Many countries, both developing and developed, have adopted growth management 
policies for a national development. Typically, growth management policies aim to constrain 
excessive population growth and urban sprawl, which cause traffic congestion, air pollution, and 
other urban problems (Cho, 2002). However, some countries adopt growth management policies 
based on strong land use regulations to solve the problem of uneven regional development (Youn 
and Kim, 2006). South Korea is an excellent example of a country implementing growth 
management policies to prevent excessive concentration of population and industry as well as 
balance regional development for several decades. In particular, South Korea has implemented 
strong land use regulations controlling the growth of the capitol region (Seoul, and around areas) 
in order to encourage balanced regional development between the capitol area and the non-
capitol area rather than prevent urban ills resulting from overcrowding.  
However, there are ongoing debates about the relationship between the regulatory 
policies and the balanced regional development. Kim, E., and Kim, K.(2003) conclude that 
although Korea’s central government has continuously attempted to introduce various policies to 
diminish the economic inequality between the six largest developed cities and the other less 
developed regions, there is no significant evidence that these regulatory policies have decreased 
economic inequality. Rather, they find that income has been distributed more equally in the 
largest developed cities than in other less developed regions for the same period. Kim and Lim 
(2005) maintain that the regulatory policies in the capitol region do not have a positive effect on 
balanced regional development. Also, they emphasize that negative effects should be taken more 
seriously because the regulatory policies decrease national competitiveness. On the contrary, 
Hong and Im (2015) assert that the gap between the capitol and non-capitol regions has been 
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reduced by the early 2000s. However, in 2008, land use deregulations in the capitol region 
weakened the economic foundation of the non-capitol region (Hong and Im, 2015).  
To my knowledge, there are a lot of studies that analyze how regulatory policies in the 
capitol region affect economic growth of the capitol and non-capitol regions. However, there are 
few studies that analyze how land use deregulations in the capitol region influence the economic 
growth of the capitol and non-capitol regions. Therefore, in this paper I aim to examine the 
extent of the effect that the land use deregulation in the capitol region has on growth of both 
regions. To address this question, I use a difference-in-differences model to empirically analyze 
how the land use deregulation in the capitol region in 2008 has affected the economic growth of 
the capitol and non-capitol regions. My analysis will help to resolve controversy about the 
capitol region regulations, which are the backbone of South Korea’s growth management 
policies.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In the U.S, since the 1970s many local governments have adopted growth management 
policies to prevent urban problems like pollution and congestion. After the 2000s, many scholars 
have carried out studies to evaluate effects of these growth management policies.   
Nelson and Peterman (2000) empirically analyze economic effects of growth 
management policies by comparing “the relative share of total personal income in the U.S” (p. 
281) between the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with growth management programs and 
those without the growth management programs. They use the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression model defining “the dependent variable as the change in the relative share of total 
personal income” (p. 281), and the experimental variable as the growth management programs. 
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Their findings show that the growth management programs have a positive influence on the 
economic performance of local governments.  
On the other hand, Saks (2008) and Ogura (2010) maintain that growth management 
policies restrain the sustained growth of regions that are influenced by those policies. By using 
simple regression models with fixed effects, Saks examines how land use restrictions influence 
labor markets in MSAs. This study suggests the land use restrictions have a detrimental effect on 
the labor markets in MSAs. In particular, these restrictions decrease housing supply, which in 
turn leads to an upsurge in housing prices. Consequently, the land use restrictions drive workers 
out of the cities because the workers cannot meet the housing prices in the cities. For this reason, 
the growth of the labor market is lower in regions with land use restrictions. 
Likewise, Ogura’s study illustrates the relationship between urban growth controls 
(UGC) and intercity commuting. To evaluate this relationship, the author applies a gravity model 
to figure out the flow of intercity commuting in California. Ogura uses an OLS regression to 
estimate the gravity model. The results suggest that the UGC move workers to the outer areas of 
a city. The moving of the workers makes commuting time longer and more costly, hence 
residential development in the city is restricted because “UGC are typically imposed by local 
jurisdictions without considering the location of workers and firms in nearby places” (p. 2187). 
From an Economic perspective, Nandwa and Ogura (2013) assess the effect of urban 
growth controls on regional production by using utility functions based on Brueckner’s (1999) 
growth control model. Nandwa and Ogura reveal that “with strong agglomeration economies in 
production, local governments tend to over-restrict population growth, thus leading to 
inefficiently low production growth” (p. 669). 
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To sum up, local governments, not a central government, adopt growth management 
policies or urban growth controls in the U.S. Therefore, the purpose of growth management is to 
entirely prevent urban problems that the residents of areas controlled by local governments are 
facing. For these reasons, most research dealing with these subjects tends to focus on how the 
growth management or controls have effects on those regions that adopt the growth management 
or controls. On the contrary, most studies in South Korea deal with the effects of the growth 
management policies on balanced development between the developed regions and less 
developed regions. This is because growth management policies in South Korea aim to support 
the growth of other less developed regions by restricting the growth of more developed regions. 
Particularly, the regulations for growth control over the capitol region are the most controversial 
issue in South Korea. 
The study of Lee and Song (2011) advocate that the regulations in the capitol region are 
necessary to balanced regional development. The authors examine “correlation between the 
centralization of the capitol region and the regional disparity” (p. 373). For this analysis, they 
conduct a canonical correlation analysis instead of regression because the theoretical base for 
causality between the centralization of the capitol region and the regional disparity is yet to be 
established in academia. The findings of this analysis demonstrate that the high centralization of 
the capitol region makes the regional disparity worse. 
Similarly, Hong and Im’s study (2015) emphasize that deregulations of industrial site 
volume control in the capitol region decrease new construction of factories and firms in the non-
capitol region. This study estimates the effects of the deregulations in the capitol region using the 
Tobit model and OLS regression by the Difference-in-Differences estimator. The results show 
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that the deregulations lead to new establishments of factories and firms in the capitol region 
more than in non-capitol region by 1.5 times.    
 On the other hand, Kim and Lee (2009) empirically examine the effects of the capitol 
region regulations on the productivity of the non-capitol region. For this analysis, they estimate a 
production function by the Pooling OLS using the data from the Mining and Manufacturing 
Survey. The results indicate that the current regulations over the capitol region do not help to 
improve the development of the non-capitol region and rather reduce national productivity 
because these regulations do not take into consideration the properties and differences (such as 
geographical conditions and industrial characteristics) of each region.  
Also, Youn and Kim (2006) research how the regulations in the capitol region affect the 
change of regional productivity. They use the Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate 
regional productivity and apply panel data analysis to calculate the regulation effects on the 
regional productivity. The analysis of this paper suggests that the regulations in the capitol 
region decrease productivity and weaken competitiveness of the capitol region. Furthermore, 
there is no significant improvement of the non-capitol region after the capitol region regulations.   
As we have seen above, even now a variety of scholars and economists are having 
ceaselessly vigorous debates on the effects of the growth management policies in the capitol 
region. 
 
3. Background  
Historical Development of the Growth Management Policy  
In the 1960s, the purpose of the national development in Korea was to reconstruct an 
economic base that had been destroyed by the Korean War. To establish the economic base, 
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Korea’s government first concentrated on the promotion programs of six strategic cities (Seoul, 
Pusan, Taegu, Inchon, Daejeon, and Gwangju), which were selected as growth poles. These 
growth management policies were very successful in rapidly increasing the national growth; 
however, as graph 1 shows, they also gave rise to excessive population concentration in the 
capitol region as well as serious social inequality such as an asymmetry between regions (Kim, 
2003).  
Graph 1. Population 1970~2014 
 
 Note. The growth management policies lead to population concentration into the capitol region. Source : The 
Statistics Korea. 
 
For these reasons, during the 1970s the Korean government shifted the aim of the 
growth management policies from fueling the national growth to supporting balanced regional 
growth. The changed growth management policies focused on preventing enlargement and 
centralization of metropolitan areas, especially the capitol region (Seoul, Inchon and Gyeonggi), 
so that less developed regions can catch up with the developed regions. In particular, in 1982 
Thousand population 
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Korean government enacted the Capitol Region Readjustment Planning Act (CRRPA), which 
was based on strong regulations of land use. The core purpose of the CRRPA is to restrict 
facilities (factories, universities, etc.) enticing population and money (OECD, 2009). Under the 
CRRPA, the capitol region has been classified into three different districts: Overpopulated 
Constraint District 1 , Growth Management District 2 , and Nature Conservation District 3 . 
According to the classification, The Korean government has allocated the quota on the new 
construction of industrial facilities and buildings and limited the expansion of existing factories 
and academic institutions. Since then, the Korean government has adhered to the strong land use 
regulations in the capitol region.  
 
Administrative Divisions of South Korea 
As table 1 shows, South Korea consists of 1 special city, 1 special autonomous city, 6 
metropolitan cities, 8 provinces (formally called “Do”), and 1 special self-governing province. 
These are subdivided into 227 lower level local governments. The capitol region includes three 
different administrative divisions: Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi-do. It is the center of economy, 
business, industry, and culture in South Korea.  
Table 1. Administrative Divisions of South Korea 
Division Name 
Area 
(㎢) 
Population 
(Million) 
Note 
Special city4 Seoul 605 10.20 The capitol region 
Special autonomous 
city5 
Sejong 465 0.11  
                                          
1 Districts where dispersion of population or factories into other districts is needed due to the excessive concentrate of 
population and industry  
2 Districts where growth management is needed for sustained growth   
3 Districts where development is restricted for the natural environment conservation 
4 The capital city of South Korea 
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Metropolitan cities6 
Busan 770 3.54  
Daegu 884 2.51  
Daejeon 540 1.52  
Gwangju 501 1.47  
Incheon 1041 2.84 The capitol region 
Ulsan 1060 1.15  
Provinces7 
Gyeonggi-do 10171 12.10 The capitol region 
Gangwon-do 16874 1.54  
Chungcheongbuk-do 7406 1.57  
Chungcheongnam-do 8204 2.10  
Gyeongsangbuk-do 19029 2.70  
Gyeongsangnam-do 10535 3.32  
Jeollabuk-do 8067 1.91  
Jeollanam-do 12267 1.91  
Special self-governing 
province8 
Jeju-do 1849 0.58  
Note. South Korea consists of 1 special city, 1 special autonomous city, 6 metropolitan cities, 8 provinces, and 1 
special self-governing province. Source : http://www.korea.net/Government/Constitution-and-Government/Local-
Governments. 
 
 
The Mitigation of the Capitol Region Regulation 
In 2008, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) mitigated or abolished 
considerable regulations limiting new industrial establishments and the expansion of existing 
industrial facilities in the capitol region by “the Effective Management of Land Use for 
Enhancing National Competitiveness”. In particular, this act allowed development, expansion, 
                                                                                                                                       
5 The administrative capital city of South Korea 
6 The first-level administrative divisions in South Korea, metropolitan cities have the equal rank to the provinces 
7 The first-level administrative divisions in South Korea, provinces have the equal rank to the metropolitan cities  
8 The province with more autonomous rights over its economy  
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and relocation of firms and factories in industrial complexes of the capitol region, regardless of 
size or category of industry. Also, the act permitted existing factories of the high-tech industry 
outside industrial complexes to expand their size. In other words, the Korea’s government allows 
almost all establishment and expansion of industrial facilities in the capitol region, regardless of 
the size of factory and category of industry. This deregulation has been one of the drastic 
changes in the regulatory policies because there was rare permission for any new construction or 
expansion before 2008, except for only 8 categories in the high-tech industry (BYUN et al., 
2011). Table 2 shows the summary for the mitigation of industry regulations.  
Table 2. The Mitigation of the Capitol Region Regulation for industry 
The type of 
district 
Firm 
size 
The type of 
zoning 
Pre-deregulation Post-deregulation 
Overpopulated 
constraint 
district 
Large-
sized 
firm 
Industrial complex Prohibition Permission 
Other 
Industrial 
zone 
Prohibition 
-Exception: Expansion of 
high-tech industry within 
1000m2 
Prohibition 
-Exception: Expansion of 
high-tech industry within 
200% 
Other 
Prohibition 
-Exception: Expansion of 
high-tech industry within 
1000m2 
Prohibition 
-Exception: Expansion of 
high-tech industry within 
100% 
Small and medium-sized firm Permission Permission 
Growth 
management 
district 
Large-
sized 
firm 
Industrial complex Prohibition Permission 
Other 
Industrial 
zone 
Prohibition 
-Exception: Expansion 
within 3000m2 
Permission 
Relocation(8 categories) All categories 
Other 
Prohibition 
-Exception: Expansion of 
high-tech industry within 
100%  
Permission 
Small and medium-sized firm Permission Permission 
Note. The Korea’s government allows all establishment and expansion of industrial facilities in the capitol region. 
Source : Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2008). 
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4. Research Methodology  
Research Design  
To estimate the effect that the deregulation of the capitol region has on the economic 
growth of the capitol and non-capitol region, this study uses a difference-in-differences (DID) 
model. Typically, the DID model is utilized to evaluate the effects of public policies. The 
treatment effect in Figure 1 indicates the net effect of a public policy, after general effects like 
time trend and business cycles are eliminated. In particular, one can find the treatment effect by 
calculating the difference in the average change before and after the policy was applied to the 
treatment group (one group affected by a policy) and the control group (not affected by the 
policy).  
Figure 1. The difference-in-differences estimator of the treatment effect 
  Note. The treatment effect is the difference in the average change before and after the policy was applied to the 
treatment group and the control group. Source: Blundell, R., Brewer, M. & Shephard, A. (2005). 
 
This paper uses the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the DID estimator to 
measure the policy effect, which is the result of deregulation in the capitol region. The equation 
is presented as follows. The treatment group is the capitol region because the regulatory policies 
have been applied for the capitol region. Also, I denote the period after the deregulation in the 
capitol region as Time=1 and the period before this as Time=0. 
- yi : The outcome of individual i 
- θ0 : The non-receipt of treatment, θ1 : The receipt of treatment  
- t0 : Pre-treatment period, t1 : Post-treatment period 
 t0 t1 
Control group (λ0) θ0 θ0 
Treatment group (λ1) θ0 θ1 
Treatment effect (E[yt1 |λ1, θ1] − E[yt0 |λ1, θ0]) − (E[yt1 |λ0, θ0] − E[yt0 |λ0, θ0]) 
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Figure 2. The regression equation for the difference-in-differences model 
  Note. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with the DID estimator to measure the policy effect, which is 
deregulation effects in the capitol region. 
 
The dependent variable for this regression model is the Gross Regional Domestic 
Product (GRDP) of each region (i). The improvement of the GRDP in the non-capitol region is 
one of the most important goals of the capitol region regulations (Youn and Kim, 2006). 
Therefore, comparing the change of the GRDP between the capitol and non-capitol region is a 
reasonable method of examining the policy effect of the deregulations over the capitol region. 
With regard to independent variables, the model includes dummy variables for a treatment group 
(The capitol region = 1, the non-capitol region = 0) and for time period (before 2008 & 2008 = 0, 
after 2008 = 1), and an interaction term indicating the policy effect caused by the deregulation. 
Also, my study includes control variables affecting the GRDP with reference to the related 
literature. The description of variables is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. The description of variables 
 Variable Measurement 
Dependent variable GRDP 
Korean Won in billions 
(at constant 2010 prices) 
Independent variable Treatment group 
Non-capitol region = 0 
Capitol region = 1   
Yi,t = β0 + β1Treat + β2Time + β3(Treat × Time) + β4Control + ε 
 
 - Yi,t : The outcome of Region i in year t 
 - Treat : The dummy variable indicating the statue of treatment (Non-treat = 0, Treat = 1) 
 - Time : The dummy variable indicating time period (Pre = 0, Post = 1)  
 - Treat × Time : The policy effect 
 - Control : The general socio-economic variables affecting the outcome 
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Time 
before 2008 & 2008 = 0 
after 2008 = 1 
Policy effect Treat × Time 
Control 
variable 
Economic 
factor 
Operating surplus9 Korean Won in billions 
Economically active pop10 Number in thousands 
Recession11 
2008 ~ 2009 = 1 
Others = 0 
Social 
factor 
Gender Rate Percentage of male 
College Grad Rate  Percentage 
 Note. This analysis includes independent variables to estimate policy effects and control variables to estimate 
general effects. 
 
Data Collection  
This study utilizes data sets extracted from Korean national statistics during 2000 - 2014. 
Since the capitol region regulations were mitigated in 2008, the time period of the data sets 
would be suitable for analyzing the change before and after the deregulation. The variables of 
“GRDP” and “operating surplus” are from Regional Account; the variables of “gender rate” and 
“college grad rate” are from Population Census; and the variable of “economically active pop” is 
from Economically Active Population Survey.  
Summary statistics, divided into two groups of the capitol and non-capitol region, are 
presented in Table 4. As evidenced by the table, the average values of all economic indicators in 
the capitol region are much higher than those in the non-capitol region.  
Table 4. Summary Statistics 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
The capitol region (Treatment group) 
GRDP (Billion Won) 45 182831 100651 38192 314160 
                                          
9 The proxy variable of capital stock to estimate impact of capital input (Youn & Kim, 2006)  
10 The variable to estimate impact of labor input (Youn & Kim, 2006) 
11 The variable to estimate impact of global financial crisis of 2008–09 
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Operating Surplus (Billion Won) 45 63272 45374 6639 145996 
Economically Active Pop (Thousand Pop) 45 3964 1930 1163 6442 
College Grad Rate 45 36.75 8.14 20.29 53.25 
Gender Rate 45 59.37 1.53 55.76 61.48 
The non-capitol region (Control group) 
GRDP 195 44770 22118 7612 102835 
Operating Surplus 195 8101 4640 1768 22935 
Economically Active Pop 195 944 402 268 1773 
College Grad Rate 195 30.93 8.60 14.20 49.34 
Gender Rate 195 57.87 2.39 52.16 66.67 
Other dummy variables: Treatment group, Time period, Policy effect, Recession 
Total observations: 240 on 16 Provinces and cities, Year : 2000 ~ 2014 
Note. Summary statistics, which is divided into two groups of the capitol and non-capitol region. 
 
Overview of the GRDP  
Most of all, the essential assumption for the DID model is that the GRDP in the capitol 
region (treatment group) and the non-capitol region (control group) would have the same trends 
in the absence of the policy change (Gruber, 2013). If one group shows a different trend from the 
other group in the absence of the policy change, the estimate of the DID model will be distorted. 
Therefore, it is necessary to monitor trends of the GRDP of both regions before the policy 
change. In Graph 2, both regions have steadily increased their GRDP with similar pace from 
2000 to 2008; thus, we can assume the GRDP follows the same trend in the absence of the policy 
change. Table 5 shows the average annual increasing rate of GRDP of both the capitol and non-
capitol region. For the time period from 2000 to 2008, the capitol region had 0.46% higher 
increasing rate than the non-capitol region. However, after 2008, the capitol region has 
maintained the same rate as the non-capitol region.  
To sum up, the deregulations in the capitol region did not encourage the economic 
growth of the capitol region; at the same time, the deregulations did not hamper the economic 
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development of the non-capitol region. To analyze accurately this explanation, this paper 
conducts the OLS regression with the DID estimator in next section.         
Graph 2. The yearly GRDP of each region  
 
  Note. Both regions have steadily increased their GRDP with similar pace from 2000 to 2008. 
 
 
Table 5. The average annual increasing rate of GRDP 
Note. the capitol region has maintained the same rate as the non-capitol region after the deregulations. 
 
5. Analysis and Results 
Before I do the OLS regression analysis, I have to verify if the data support the 
assumption about OLS regression because the wrong data can lead to incorrect results of the 
 Total 2000~2008 2009~2014 
Capitol region 3.78% 4.19% 3.05% 
Non-capitol region 3.50% 3.73% 3.05% 
Billion Won 
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analysis. For this purpose, I check the homoscedasticity of residuals and multicollinearity among 
the independent variables. 
 
Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals 
Homoscedasticity of residuals is one of the most critical assumptions for the OLS 
regression. The homoscedasticity means that the variance of residuals is constant across the 
variables (Hansen, 2016). If the residuals do not have constant variance (Heteroscedasticity), it is 
a common solution to use OLS regression with a “robust” option of Stata. In this paper, I do the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test to check whether or not the variance of the residuals is 
homogenous. As we can see from Table 6, since the P-value is very small, the hypothesis that the 
residuals have constant variance is to be rejected. Therefore, we can see that the variance of the 
residuals shows the heteroscedasticity.   
Table 6. The result of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of GRDP 
chi2(1) = 8.21 Prob > chi2 = 0.0042 
Note. The hypothesis that the residuals have constant variance is to be rejected. 
 
 
Checking Multicollinearity 
The multicollinearity means the situation in which two or more of the variables are 
highly correlated (Hansen, 2016). When the multicollinearity exists, it makes the standard errors 
greater and estimates of the coefficients unstable and sensitive. As a result, in the presence of the 
multicollinearity, it will be difficult for the null hypothesis to be rejected.  
I use the VIF (variance inflation factor) to detect the multicollinearity. Typically, when 
the VIF value is higher than 10 or the tolerance value(1/VIF) is lower than 0.1 there is high 
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multicollinearity. The result of the VIF test indicates the variables have no values of 10 or above. 
Although all variables remain under 10 point, “Economically Active Pop” and “Operating 
Surplus”, with quite high VIF values, might be considered as factors to lead to the incorrect 
result of the regression analysis. However, it is common that variables are highly correlated in 
time series, but their changes are not strongly correlated (the correlation by the time trend is to be 
dealt with in next section). Therefore, there is no problem with the multicollinearity here.  
Table 7. The result of VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Economically Active Pop 8.22 0.121678 
Operating Surplus 7.57 0.132168 
treat 3.43 0.291964 
Policy effect 2.04 0.490289 
College Grad Rate 1.66 0.60287 
time 1.61 0.621736 
Gender Rate 1.14 0.87538 
recession 1.02 0.982091 
Mean VIF 3.33 
 
Note. The result of the VIF test indicates the variables have no values of 10 or above. 
 
 
Spurious Correlation by the Time Trend 
As Table 8 shows, this regression demonstrates spurious correlation owing to the time 
trend and should not be reported in the results. In the presence of time trends, all variables 
predict each other regardless of whether they actually have any economic or policy relationship 
at all. This is called spurious regression meaning regression only through growth, not through 
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any real relationship. This regression shows that GRDP grows over time. The solution is to apply 
the first differencing operator12 to this model.  
Table 8. The result of the robust regression including GRDP, year, and intersection variables 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
Year 1329.808 474.8115 2.8 0.006 
Intersection (Provinces and cities ×Year) 
 
 
  
Chungcheongbuk-do -2376.94 278.0066 -8.55 0.000 
Chungcheongnam-do 1613.592 183.1512 8.81 0.000 
Daegu -2399.93 211.0092 -11.37 0.000 
Daejeon -3528.38 283.1932 -12.46 0.000 
Gangwon-do -3211.2 261.4519 -12.28 0.000 
Gwangju -3652.92 304.503 -12 0.000 
Gyeonggi-do 18528.04 750.9582 24.67 0.000 
Gyeongsangbuk-do 1380.135 53.37959 25.86 0.000 
Gyeongsangnnam-do 1854.846 70.32829 26.37 0.000 
Incheon -549.389 101.1032 -5.43 0.000 
Jeju-do -5066.22 400.4521 -12.65 0.000 
Jeollabuk-do -2684.78 222.8736 -12.05 0.000 
Jeollanam-do -557.047 74.87295 -7.44 0.000 
Seoul 21417.03 1549.112 13.83 0.000 
Ulsan -9.07419 50.8653 -0.18 0.859 
_cons 49638.94 4897.81 10.13 0.000 
Number of obs =     240 
                                                       F( 16,   223) =  222.97 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8907 
Note. This regression shows spurious correlation owing to the time trend and should not be reported in the results. 
 
 
 
                                          
12 “The dth differencing operator applied to a time series x is to create a new series z whose value at time t is the difference 
between x(t + d) and x(t). This method works very well in removing trends and cycles.” (Newton (1999), Slide 4). 
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The Results of the Regression Analysis 
Since the variance of the residuals of the data shows the heteroscedasticity, I run a robust 
regression using Stata (statistical software). Of course, all variables will be in change form, 
including dummy variables, to solve the problem of the spurious regression.  
Table 9 shows the result of the first-difference regression. According to the regression 
results, the “Policy effect” variable, which interprets the effect on the deregulation in the capitol 
region, is not statistically significant. In terms of the control variables, all variables but “College 
grad rate” are statistically significant Indicators of the GRDP at the 5% level.   
The prime purpose of the analysis is to evaluate the effect of the deregulation in the 
capitol region using the treatment variables. The interpretation of the treatment variables is 
central to this regression model. First, the variable “Treat” is significant (Coefficient = 2529.62, 
P-value = 0.001). The variable “Treat”, which refers to just the capitol region, can be included to 
show that when other variables are equal the capitol region grows faster. Second, the “Time” 
variable is also statistically significant (Coefficient = -1246.82, P-value = 0.002). It indicates that 
first differenced GRDP has considerably decreased after 2008. Lastly, the “Policy effect” 
variable, which shows the difference-in-differences estimator on the mitigation of the capitol 
region regulations, is not statistically significant (Coefficient = -2284.12, P-value = 0.187). it 
means that when the regulations of the capitol region are mitigated, GRDP does not experience 
any significant change. In other words, there is no correlation between the deregulation and the 
economic growth of the capitol region as well as the non-capitol region. Also, regardless of the 
statistical significance of the “Policy effect” coefficient, we cannot suggest that the deregulation 
policy has a negative effect on the GRDP of the non-capitol region since the coefficient has 
negative values. 
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In terms of control variables, “Economically active pop”, “Operating Surplus”, and 
“Gender Rate” have a positive effect on “GRDP”. In other words, factors related to productivity 
contribute to the growth of GRDP. Variable “Recession”, which is included to estimate sudden 
changes occurring in time-specific trends, has a negative effect on GRDP. It means that the 
global financial crisis of 2008–09 led to downturn in economic activity in South Korea. 
Table 9. The result of the robust regression with differenced variables 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t 
Economically Active Pop D1. 37.86898 7.323061 5.17 0.000 
Operating Surplus D1. 0.257767 0.114129 2.26 0.025 
College Grad Rate D1. -14.2368 118.557 -0.12 0.905 
Gender Rate D1. 431.0187 207.2858 2.08 0.039 
Recession D1. -967.5 418.077 -2.31 0.022 
Treat  2529.62 775.7482 3.26 0.001 
Time D1. -1246.82 392.2069 -3.18 0.002 
Policy effect D1. -2284.12 1727.376 -1.32 0.187 
Cons 1339.878 207.225 6.47 0.000 
Number of obs =     224 
                                                       F(  8,   215) =   15.72 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6488 
Note. According to the regression results, the “Policy effect” variable, which interprets the effect on the deregulation 
of the capitol region, is not statistically significant.  
 
Findings  
This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the GRDP of each region and 
the deregulation in the capitol region using OLS regression with the difference-in-differences 
estimator. Consequently, the results of the regression model do not demonstrate any statistically 
significant relationship between the GRDP of each region and the deregulation in the capitol 
region. In other words, this analysis does not (at least statistically) provide any evidence to 
support assertions that the mitigation of the regulations in the capitol region hindered the 
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economic growth of the non-capitol region or gave an unfair advantage to the capitol region. 
These findings are somewhat consistent with the results found by Youn and Kim (2006) in their 
empirical analysis. Both this paper and Youn and Kim’s paper (2006) investigate the effect of the 
capitol region regulations by estimating the change of the GRDP. The results of the analysis 
point out that the effects are insignificant to the GRDP, an indicator showing regional economic 
development.     
 
Limitation  
For more cohesive results, this study might need a larger number of samples, including 
data of lower-level local governments. However, since the Korean National Statistical Office 
does not provide the data of lower level for GRDP, I cannot include sufficient data numbers. 
Moreover, a further analysis needs to consider not only GRDP but also other economic factors 
such as the change of income or employment rate as the dependent variable. Various studies 
produce a variety of alternative explanations on the effect of deregulations in the capitol region. 
Therefore, the additional dependent variables and sufficient data, including lower-level local 
government, can strengthen the reliability of the analysis on the effect of deregulations in the 
capitol region.    
In addition, the DID estimate assumes that there is no sudden impact affecting the 
outcome in the presence of a policy change. However, since it is impossible to include all 
variables to control for all possible sudden impact, the outcome would be biased due to 
unobserved variables. This problem is also likely to be solved by increasing the number of 
observations and implementing long-term study.    
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6. Conclusion  
This paper investigates the effects of deregulation in the capitol region on GRDP in 
South Korea by using OLS regression analysis with the DID estimator. Since the deregulation in 
the capitol region happened in 2008, this study includes the time period between 2000 and 2014. 
The main purpose of this paper is to address the question about whether or not the regulation in 
the capitol region supports balanced regional development by examining the extent of effect that 
the deregulation has on the economic growth in the capitol and non-capitol region.  
The results suggest that the deregulations in the capitol region have no significant effects 
on the change of GRDP. In other words, the regulatory policy in the capitol region does not 
promote balanced regional development because the deregulation does not restrict the economic 
growth of the non-capitol region. Moreover, as we have seen from the results of the analysis, the 
GRDP has a high correlation with the factors related to productivity such as economically active 
population and operating surplus. Therefore, one possible explanation for this result is that the 
difference of economic growth between regions depends on the difference of productivity in 
each region, instead of the presence of regulations. This explanation supports Seo (2001) and 
Park et al. (2004)’s contentions that high growth rate of the capitol region results from higher 
total factor productivity in the capitol region than other regions. In this regard, Korea’s 
government needs to consider policies that promote productivity of less developed regions to 
balance the regional growth.               
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